Toilet poopcam maker Kohler criticised for misleading advertising claiming to encrypt your poop pics, discovered to actually be collecting unencrypted pictures of your poop:
>The initial issue with Kohler using the term "end-to-end encryption" is that it's not obvious how it could apply to their product. The term is generally used for applications that allow some kind of communication between users, and Kohler Health doesn't have any user-to-user sharing features. So while one "end" would be the user, it's not clear what the other end would be.
>I thought Kohler might actually have implemented a related data protection method known as "client-side encryption", used by services like Apple's iCloud and the password manager 1Password. This technique allows an application to back up a user's data to the developers servers, or synchronize data between multiple devices owned by a user, without allowing anyone but the user to access the data.
>But emails exchanged with Kohler's privacy contact clarified that the other "end" that can decrypt the data is Kohler themselves: "User data is encrypted at rest, when it's stored on the user's mobile phone, toilet attachment, and on our systems. Data in transit is also encrypted end-to-end, as it travels between the user's devices and our systems, where it is decrypted and processed to provide our service."
Always read your toilet cam terms and conditions fine print, bernds
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